Changes between Initial Version and Version 1 of MalwareRepositoryDiscussion


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Timestamp:
Nov 11, 2010 2:57:51 PM (14 years ago)
Author:
mikeryan
Comment:

rough outline

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  • MalwareRepositoryDiscussion

    v1 v1  
     1[[TOC]]
     2
     3'''Needs attention:'''
     4 * When Steve finds out how large the repo is, update the storage section
     5 * Someone investigate encrypted loopback images and expand that section
     6 * Policy issues needs more work
     7
     8== Running the malware ==
     9
     10=== Infrastructure security ===
     11
     12Revisit the firewall rules on router to prevent leakage channels. Absolute minimum set of services should be allowed from testbed -> users/boss/etc.
     13
     14=== Isolation from other experiments ===
     15
     16Control net separation
     17
     18== Storage and Leakage ==
     19
     20Primary goals are to allow vetted users to access the malware safely and prevent unauthorized users from gaining access.
     21
     22=== Leakage of binaries ===
     23
     24Some belt-and-suspenders support to prevent leakage is to export NFS shares read-only:
     25
     26 * /proj, /groups, /share, etc.
     27 * home directories
     28
     29=== Storage ===
     30
     31Where/how we store it depends on how large it is. Steve is looking into this.
     32
     33 * Loopback encrypted file system on users:/share, read only
     34  * Encryption options
     35  * Shared password
     36  * Revocation (is this necessary)
     37 * OS ID with strict access controls
     38  * Is it possible to limit the projects this is exported to?
     39
     40== Policy Issues ==
     41
     42 * Do not copy it off experiment
     43 * Do not attempt to run on non-malware experiment
     44
     45== Miscellaneous ==
     46
     47Updates will probably be done via HTTPS with a client certificate. This depends on the GA guys.
     48
     49How will we annotate the experiment file to let the testbed know this needs special treatment (i.e., read-only mounts, copy encryption key/token to box)?